|
|||||||
|
|
|
|||||
|
|
|||||||
C. V. CLAUSEWITZ AND MILITARY THOUGHT
By. Dr. George Voskopoulos, Senior Research Officer, South East European Research Centre (www.seerc.info)
Introduction
This short and simplified paper analyses the perceptions on military strategy introduced by C. V. Clausewitz, the famous Prussian military genius. Ever since Clausewitz’s writings saw the light of publicity, a new perspective on military strategy appeared that has influenced in a way most strategists. This work is going to present the new perceptions of Clausewitz, such as the political aspect of war, which differentiated him from the standard views on war that strategists had until then.
Furthermore, it will also look into the newly introduced (at that time) idea of genius that analysed all the psychological factors, that according to Clausewitz, affected the military, from the plain soldier to the rank of general. Finally, it will present the concept of friction as it is involved in military tactics and estimations as well as the notion of chance that may affect a strategist’s military plans. Particular attention will be given to the political consequences and side-effects of war, to the idea of polarity which affects the behaviour of the opponents, to the violent nature of war and its trinity, and focus on the relation between military training and socio-politico-economic conditions of the state.
C.V. Clausewitz was born in 1780 and died in 1831. He experienced all the important events of the end of 18th and beginning of the 19th century such as the impact of enlightenment on sciences and the Napoleonic Wars. He began his military career in the Prussian Army as an officer in the internal revenue service. Later, in 1801 he entered the military school in Berlin, where he met the man who influenced most his career and military thought, General Scharnhorst, who was head of the School. Gradually, he took up important positions in the Prussian Army such as the post of Major-General and director of the Military School in 1818 and Inspector of Artillery in 1830.
His objective was to modernise the Prussian Army. For this reason, he joined an alliance of civilian and military that aimed to reform the Prussian Armed Forces (1). Not only did he write about war, tactics and strategy, but also about philosophy and history. His tutor, General Scharnhorst, who was practically his mentor, influenced him a lot with his views on the way the social forces determined and dictated the strategy, as well as the military tactics and capabilities of a state (2). His philosophical, social and psychological analysis of war has greatly influenced strategists until nowadays. Yet, his theory has also been criticised as being inapplicable nowadays.
Until the end of 18th century, most strategists, such as Jomini and Bulov, had focused on geographical factors, military deployment, control of key points and cutting off the communication lines of the opponent. They were consumed in practising military tactics on a map, trying to pinpoint the most “strategic” place where the battle was to be fought. P. Paret (M. Howard & P. Paret, 1976) calls them “system builders” because they focused their work on building prescribed military models, ignoring the value of human spirit.
Their main concern was how to deploy troops more effectively, without paying attention to other factors such as psychology of the army, political conditions of the country, that could affect the morale of the army as well as social and economic parameters related to war.
